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Abstract: When a belief has been influenced, in part or whole, by factors that, by the believer’s 
own lights, do not bear on the truth of the believed proposition, we can say that the belief has 
been, in a sense, arbitrarily formed. Can such beliefs ever be rational? It might seem obvious that 
they can’t. After all, belief, supposedly, “aims at the truth.” But many epistemologists have come 
to think that certain kinds of arbitrary beliefs can, indeed, be rational. In this paper, I want to 
do two things. First, I want to show that the claim that arbitrary beliefs can be rational is 
inconsistent with the conjunction of two other attractive claims: one saying that rationality 
requires a certain kind of epistemic immodesty, and one saying that rationality forbids certain kinds 
of self-ascriptions of epistemic luck. Second, I want to evaluate different ways one might respond to 
this inconsistent triad. I won’t defend any response in particular, but I’ll draw out some notable 
costs and benefits of each response, which may help shed light on the question of whether 
arbitrary beliefs can be rational. 
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1. Introduction 
Put yourself in the following situation: 
Police Corruption: You believe that the Federal Police are corrupt. At the same time, 
you realize that, had you grown up in a different neighbourhood, you most likely 
wouldn’t have believed that the Federal Police are corrupt. What’s more, bracketing your 
beliefs about police corruption, you don’t take yourself to have any reason to think that 
the neighbourhood in which you grew up is any more likely to have given you true beliefs 
about such matters as whether the Federal Police are corrupt than any other 
neighbourhood in which you might have grown up. Yet, you continue to believe that 
the Federal Police are corrupt. 
It’s easy to feel a bit uneasy about your belief in this situation. There seems to be something 
arbitrary about it. But is it, necessarily, irrational? That’s the question that interests me here. 
The question takes on a more general form. Let’s say that when a belief has been 
influenced, in part or whole, by factors that, by the believer’s own lights, do not bear on the 
truth of the believed proposition, the belief has been arbitrarily formed. The more general 
question is: Can such beliefs ever be rational? 
It might seem obvious that they can’t. After all, belief, supposedly, “aims at the truth.” 
But many epistemologists have come to think that certain kinds of arbitrary beliefs can, 
 
indeed, be rational. As we’ll see, they don’t all agree about which arbitrary beliefs can be 
rational, and why. But they all agree that arbitrary beliefs can at least sometimes be rational. 
In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I want to show that the claim that arbitrary 
beliefs can be rational is inconsistent with the conjunction of two other attractive claims: one 
saying that rationality requires a certain kind of epistemic immodesty, and one saying that 
rationality forbids certain kinds of self-ascriptions of epistemic luck. Second, I want to evaluate 
different ways one might respond to this inconsistent triad. I won’t defend any response in 
particular, but I’ll draw out some notable costs and benefits of each response, which may 
help shed light on the question of whether arbitrary beliefs can be rational. 
After clarifying the notion of arbitrary belief that I want to focus on (§2), I’ll review 
some prevalent reasons to think that arbitrary beliefs can be rational (§3). I’ll then go on to 
show that the view that arbitrary beliefs can be rational is jointly inconsistent with the 
aforementioned views about epistemic immodesty and self-ascriptions of epistemic luck (§4). 
Finally, I’ll examine different possible responses to this inconsistent triad (§5), and draw 
together some general lessons (§6). 
2. Preliminaries on Arbitrary Beliefs 
Above I characterized arbitrary beliefs as “beliefs that have been influenced, in part or whole, 
by factors that, by the believer’s own lights, do not bear on the truth of the believed 
proposition.” This hopefully gave the reader an initial sense of the phenomenon that we’ll 
be concerned with. In this section, I want to say a bit more about the notion of arbitrary 
belief. I won’t try to give precise, necessary and sufficient conditions for when a belief has 
been, in the relevant sense, arbitrarily formed. The aim is just to say enough to enable us to 
distinguish the relevant notion of arbitrary belief from other natural senses in which a belief 
might be said to be, or not to be, arbitrary. 
Let me begin with an observation that, although elementary, is nonetheless worth 
keeping in mind, namely that it’s often a matter of accident what evidence we have at our 
disposal—it depends on our upbringing, education, social circle, and countless other factors 
that lie (at least partly) beyond our control. Here is a familiar example from the history of 
science: 
Heliocentrism: You believe that the earth circles the sun. At the same time, you realize 
that, had you been born in a different historical era—say, Paleolithic times—you 
wouldn’t have had the kind of extensive evidence about the earth’s movement relative 
to the sun that you in fact have, and hence wouldn’t have believed that the earth circles 
the sun. Yet, you continue to so believe. 
I take it that there is a recognizable sense in which your belief in this case might be said to 
be arbitrary. After all, it is, in a sense, arbitrary or accidental that you should end up with an 
extensive body of evidence about the earth’s movement relative to the sun. However, this is 
not the kind of arbitrariness that will concern us here. It’s uncontroversial that it can be 
 
rational to believe what your evidence supports, even if it was a matter of accident that you 
came to possess that evidence. The question we’ll be interested in is whether it can be rational 
to have a belief that has been influenced by factors that, by your own lights, do not bear on 
the truth.1 
Next, I’d like to clarify what I mean by saying that arbitrary beliefs are ones that have 
been influenced by factors that, by the believer’s own lights, do not bear on the truth. Consider 
the following modified version of Police Corruption: 
Modified Police Corruption: You believe that the Federal Police are corrupt. 
However, if you had grown up in a different neighbourhood, you wouldn’t have believed 
that the Federal Police are corrupt. What’s more, the neighbourhood in which you 
actually grew up is, unbeknownst to you, no more likely to have given you true beliefs 
about such matters as whether the Federal Police are corrupt than any other 
neighbourhood in which you might have grown up. Yet, you continue to believe that 
the Federal Police are corrupt. 
Again, I take it that there is a recognizable sense in which your belief that the Federal Police 
are corrupt might be said to be arbitrary. After all, it is, in a sense, arbitrary or accidental that 
you should end up in this neighbourhood rather than that. But again, this is not the kind of 
arbitrariness that will concern us here. The reason for this is largely dialectical: if it can be 
rational to have beliefs that have been influenced by factors that, by your own lights, do not 
bear on the truth, it can presumably also be rational to have beliefs that have been influenced 
by factors that, unbeknownst to you, do not bear on the truth. In other words, someone who 
thinks that the latter kind of arbitrary beliefs can be rational should presumably also think 
that the former kind of arbitrary beliefs can be rational. By contrast, it’s not clear that 
someone who denies that the former kind of arbitrary beliefs can be rational should also 
deny that the latter kind of arbitrary beliefs can be rational. Indeed, the inconsistent triad that 
I’ll bring out below pertains only to the former kind of arbitrary beliefs. This is why, as a 
matter of stipulation, I’ll count cases like Police Corruption, but not cases like Modified 
Police Corruption, as cases of arbitrary belief. 
 
1 It’s perhaps not immediately clear why your belief that the earth circles the sun doesn’t count as having been 
influenced by factors that, by your own lights, do not bear on the truth. After all, you wouldn’t have believed 
that the earth circles the sun if you had grown up in Paleolithic times; and, by your own lights, the historical 
era in which you grew up has no bearing on the whether the earth circles the sun. Doesn’t this show that there’s 
at least a sense in which your belief that the earth circles the sun has been influenced by factors that, by your 
own lights, do not bear on the truth? I think so. However, in the Heliocentrism case, you take yourself to be in 
a better evidential position than you would have been in, if you had grown up in Paleolithic times. By contrast, 
in the Police Corruption case, you don’t take yourself to be in a better evidential position than you would have 
been in, if you had grown up in a different neighbourhood. For our purposes here, that’s the crucial difference 
between Police Corruption and Heliocentrism. 
 
Finally, I’d like to draw attention to a type of belief formation that I do want to classify 
as arbitrary, although there’s a natural sense in which it might be said not to be arbitrary. To 
illustrate the phenomenon I have in mind, consider the following scenario: 
Extreme Sapere Aude: You’ve grown up in a society in which it is customary to place 
no weight on testimonial evidence. Think for yourself!, is the society’s slogan, and it is held 
sacred by all citizens in word and deed. You’re no exception: when someone tells you 
that p, you don’t let it affect your credence in p. At the same time, you realize that, had 
you grown up in a different society, you would most likely have placed significant weight 
on testimonial evidence. What’s more, you don’t take yourself to have any independent 
reason to think that the society in which you grew up is any more likely to have a truth-
conducive way of accommodating testimonial evidence than any other society in which 
you might have grown up. Yet, you continue to place no weight on testimonial evidence. 
Here there’s a natural sense in which your beliefs haven’t been arbitrarily formed. After all, 
they’ve been formed in accordance with a general principle about how to accommodate 
testimonial evidence. As it is sometimes put: you’ve been living up to your own epistemic 
standards.2 I’ll return to the notion of epistemic standards later, and how it relates to the 
question of whether arbitrary beliefs can be rational. For now, the important point is that, in 
the Extreme Sapere Aude case (as I’ve described it), you don’t take yourself to have any 
independent reason to think that your own epistemic standards are any more truth-conducive 
than whatever other epistemic standards you might have had, if you had grown up in a 
different society. This is what makes Extreme Sapere Aude relevantly similar to Police 
Corruption: in both cases, your belief state has been influenced by factors that, by your own 
lights, do not bear on the truth. 
These preliminary remarks clearly don’t amount to anything like a precise definition. But 
I hope that they go at least some way towards fixing the class of arbitrary beliefs that I want 
to focus on. Next, I’d like to consider some of the most prevalent reasons why many 
epistemologists have come to think that such arbitrary beliefs can be rational. 
3. Why Think That Arbitrary Beliefs Can Be Rational? 
Let Rational Arbitrariness be the thesis that arbitrary beliefs, as characterized above, can be 
rational. Why think that Rational Arbitrariness is true? There are at least two general lines of 
argument, which have emerged from the recent epistemological literature. In their simplest 
form, they may be stated as follows: 
The Road from Permissivism: Rational Arbitrariness is true, since it follows from 
certain plausible assumptions about the extent to which rationality is permissive. 
 
2 See, e.g., White (2005, §3), Schoenfield (2014), Kopek and Titelbaum (ms.), Li (2019b). 
 
The Road from Anti-skepticism: Rational Arbitrariness is true, since its negation leads 
to absurd skeptical consequences. 
Below, I’ll describe each of these arguments in a bit more detail. I don’t want to suggest that 
they constitute the only (or even the best) arguments for Rational Arbitrariness.3 The aim is 
just to give the reader at least a rough sense of why someone might be attracted to the view 
that arbitrary beliefs can be rational. 
3.1 The Road from Permissivism 
Let’s say that an epistemic situation is permissive just in case there is more than one rationally 
permissible belief state to adopt in that situation. And let Epistemic Permissivism be the thesis 
that some epistemic situations are permissive.4 In recent years, a number of arguments have 
been offered in support of Epistemic Permissivism: some authors have argued that rational 
people can disagree even when confronted with the same body of evidence (Rosen 2001, p. 
71; Schoenfield 2014, §2.1); others have argued that rationality permits different trade-offs 
between the “Jamesian goals” of believing what is true and not believing what is false (Kelly 2013; 
Pettigrew ms); and still others have defended Epistemic Permissivism on the grounds that 
some belief states are epistemically supererogatory (Li 2018, 2019a; Jackson 2019). Needless to 
say, not everyone has been persuaded by these arguments. Indeed, a number of attempts 
have been made at defending the negation of Epistemic Permissivism (a thesis commonly 
known as “The Uniqueness Thesis”).5 My aim here is not to weigh and compare the various 
arguments for and against Epistemic Permissivism tha have been put forth. Rather, I’m 
interested in the connection between Epistemic Permissivism and Rational Arbitrariness. 
So what is the connection between Epistemic Permissivism and Rational Arbitrariness? 
Epistemic Permissivism doesn’t straightforwardly entail Rational Arbitrariness, but it does 
so when combined with two additional claims, which many permissivists will be inclined to 
accept. The first claim is this: 
Acknowledged Permissivism: If it’s possible to be in a permissive situation, it’s 
possible to realize that you’re in a permissive situation. 
 
3 Indeed, we’ll later (in §5.1) consider an alternative way of motivating Rational Arbitrariness, which appeals to 
a distinction between precise and imprecise credences.  
4 As stated, Epistemic Permissivism is a fairly schematic view, which can be developed in different ways, 
depending on how one answers various more specific questions, such as: How widespread are these alleged 
permissive situations? How much can different permissible belief states differ? What makes a permissive 
situation permissive in the first place? And so on. For present purposes, we don’t need to delve into these 
further questions—what I’ll have to say about Epistemic Permissivism won’t turn on the finer details of the 
view. Interested readers may consult, e.g., White (2005), Podgorski (2016), Jackson (2019), and Pettigrew (ms.).  
5 See, e.g., White (2005), Feldman (2007), Dogramaci & Horowitz (2016), and Schultheis (2018). 
 
In other words, according to Acknowledged Permissivism, if it’s possible to be in a 
permissive situation, it’s possible to know which belief states are permitted in your situation.6 
This is not to say that it’s always possible to know which belief states are permitted in your 
situation, although some permissivists might want to defend this stronger claim as well. The 
claim is just that permissive situations, insofar as they exist, aren’t systematically “elusive” in 
the sense that you can never know that you’re in one. 
Acknowledged Permissivism is rarely discussed in depth, but a number of participants 
in the permissivism debate have, if not outright endorsed it, at least found it prima facie 
plausible.7 Understandably so—it’s hard to see why it should be in-principle impossible to 
learn that you’re in a permissive situation, or why learning that you’re in a permissive situation 
should somehow turn your situation into a non-permissive one. There might be a way to 
defend a view along these lines.8 I certainly don’t want to foreclose this possibility. But I 
suspect that most permissivists would be inclined to accept Acknowledged Permissivism. 
Here is the second claim: 
Permissive Parity: If you realize that you’re in a permissive situation, you shouldn’t 
take yourself to have independent reasons to think that one permissible belief state is 
more accurate than another. 
In other words, according to Permissive Parity, if you realize that you’re permitted to be in 
either of two belief states, B and B’, you shouldn’t take yourself to have independent reasons 
(independent, that is, from the belief state you actually adopt) to think that B is more accurate 
than B’, or vice versa. In that sense, different permissible belief states are “on a par” with 
respect to their accuracy. 
Like Acknowledged Permissivism, Permissive Parity is rarely discussed in depth. 
However, some authors seem to assume it in the background,9 and I suspect that many others 
would be inclined to accept it. Consider, for example, a Subjective Bayesian who thinks that 
there is more than one permissible prior credence function (that is, more than one 
permissible set of conditional and unconditional credences prior to getting any evidence).10 
On such a view, there are presumably no independent, accuracy-based reasons to adopt one 
permissible prior over another. Rather, different permissible priors are permissible precisely 
because they are on a par with respect to their accuracy.  
Or consider someone who thinks that there’s more than one permissible trade-off 
between the “Jamesian goals” of believing what is true and not believing what is false (see, e.g., Kelly 
 
6 The label “Acknowledged Permissivism” is from Titelbaum & Kopec (ms., p. 15). The distinction between 
acknowledged and unacknowledged permissive cases can also be found in earlier papers by Ballantyne & 
Coffman (2012, p. 663) and Cohen (2013). 
7 See, e.g., Schoenfield (2014, fn 31), White (2005, p. 450), and Ye (2020). 
8 For a recent attempt to do so, see Smith (2020). See also Li (2019a, §4) for a critical discussion of different 
ways one might try to resist Acknowledged Permissivism.  
9 See, e.g., White (2005, §2) and Schoenfield (2014, fn. 20). 
10 Such a brand of permissivism is defended by, e.g., Meacham (2013) and Pettigrew (ms.). 
 
2013). On such a view, there are presumably no independent, accuracy-based reasons to 
adopt one permissible trade-off over another. Rather, an agent’s trade-off is supposed to 
reflect something like the agent’s preferred level of “epistemic risk-aversion:” roughly, how 
much the agent cares about being right and not being wrong in her beliefs, respectively. 
I don’t mean to suggest that all permissivists would be prepared to accept Permissive 
Parity. Consider, for example, someone who thinks that Epistemic Permissivism is true 
because some belief states are epistemically supererogatory in roughly the sense that they go 
beyond what is minimally required for a belief state to be rationally permissible.11 A 
proponent of such a view might want to deny Permissive Parity, at least in its unrestricted 
form. To see why, consider a situation in which there are just two permissible belief states, 
B and B’, where B is supererogatory and B’ is not. If the agent in fact adopts the 
supererogatory belief state, B, it might well be reasonable for her to take herself to have 
independent, accuracy-based reasons for adopting B rather than B’. After all, it’s natural to 
think that whatever made B supererogatory also makes B more likely to be accurate. 
So, I don’t want to claim that all proponents of Epistemic Permissivism should accept 
Acknowledged Permissivism and Permissive Parity. But those who do are committed to 
Rational Arbitrariness as well. Here is why: Consider a situation in which an agent is 
permitted to adopt either of two belief states, B and B’. If Epistemic Permissivism is true, 
such a situation is possible. And, by Acknowledged Permissivism, we may assume that the 
agent realizes that B and B’ are both permissible. Moreover, by Permissive Parity, the agent 
shouldn’t take herself to have independent, accuracy-based reasons to adopt B rather than 
B’, or vice versa. So, whatever belief state the agent adopts, the belief state will have been, in 
the relevant sense, arbitrarily formed: it will have been influenced by factors that, by the 
agent’s own lights, do not bear on the truth. In sum: if Epistemic Permissivism, 
Acknowledged Permissivism, and Permissive Parity are true, then so is Rational 
Arbitrariness. 
3.2 The Road from Anti-skepticism 
The second line of argument for Rational Arbitrariness takes the form of a reductio: denying 
Rational Arbitrariness leads to absurd skeptical consequences, so Rational Arbitrariness must 
be true. There are different ways one might try to develop this anti-skeptical line of argument, 
but one natural way takes as its starting point a familiar skeptical challenge: that of providing 
independent justification for one’s most fundamental epistemic standards.12  
Roughly speaking, epistemic standards are supposed to encode different ways an agent 
might respond to different bodies of evidence. For example, within a Bayesian framework, 
we may think of an agent’s epistemic standards as encoded in the agent’s prior credence 
 
11 Versions of this view have been defended by Li (2018; 2019a) and Jackson (2019). See also Podgorski (2016, 
§4.4) for a related proposal. 
12 Versions of this line of argument can be found in, e.g., Elga (ms.), White (2010), and Schoenfield (2014). 
 
function. More generally, we may think of an agent’s epistemic standards as a function from 
epistemic situations to belief states, representing which belief state the agent would adopt if 
put in a given epistemic situation. 
Several authors have argued for Epistemic Permissivism on the grounds that there can 
be more than one permissible set of epistemic standards.13 But even without taking a stance 
in the permissivism debate, we can motivate Rational Arbitrariness by appeal to some fairly 
general considerations about the kinds of reasons one might have (or not have) to think that 
one’s own epistemic standards are reliable.  
Imagine that you encounter a skeptic who challenges you to justify your own epistemic 
standards in a non-circular way, that is, in a way that doesn’t presuppose the reliability of 
those very standards. Here is one way such an encounter might go: after a bit of reflection, 
you concede to the skeptic that you’re unable to meet the challenge, not because you think 
that there’s anything especially defective about your own epistemic standards, but because 
you’ve come to the conclusion—say, on the basis of familiar regress considerations—that 
it’s impossible for anyone to justify their own fundamental epistemic standards without relying 
on those very standards.14 In light of this concession, the skeptic urges you to give up your 
ordinary beliefs and enter a state of radical skeptical doubt. But you resist. Instead, you 
maintain your ordinary beliefs, and acknowledge that you don’t have any independent reason 
to think that the epistemic standards by which those beliefs have been formed are reliable. 
Now if that’s how you respond to the skeptic, your belief state has been, in the relevant 
sense, arbitrarily formed: it has been influenced by a set of epistemic standards that you don’t 
take yourself to have any independent reason to think is more reliable than any other set of 
epistemic standards you might have had. So, if your response to the skeptic is rational, this 
would suffice to establish Rational Arbitrariness.  
But is it? Many epistemologists think so. They maintain that even if we can’t provide 
independent justification for our most fundamental epistemic standards, we’re not rationally 
required to enter a state of radical skeptical doubt for that reason.15 Needless to say, there 
are worries one might have about this sort of anti-skeptical position, and I certainly don’t 
want to endorse it here. The aim of these brief remarks is just to convey why some 
epistemologists have been led by general anti-skeptical concerns to accept the view that a 
certain kind of arbitrary belief formation can be rational. 
4. An Inconsistent Triad 
We’ve now seen why someone might find Rational Arbitrariness attractive. The next task is 
to show that Rational Arbitrariness is jointly inconsistent with two other attractive claims: 
 
13 See, e.g., Kelly (2013), Schoenfield (2014), and Titelbaum & Kopec (ms.).  
14 See Elga (ms.), White (2010, p. 604), and Schoenfield (2014, §2.2) for further elaboration on this point. 
15 This sort of anti-skeptical view has a long history. In recent decades, it has been prominently defended by, 
e.g., Pryor (2000) and Wright (2004). 
 
the claim that rationality requires a certain kind of immodesty, and the claim that rationality 
forbids certain kinds of self-ascriptions of epistemic luck. I’ll begin by briefly introducing 
each of these claims (§§4.1-4.2), before explaining why they form an inconsistent triad 
together with Rational Arbitrariness (§4.3). 
4.1 Epistemic Immodesty 
Following Lewis (1971), let’s say that you’re immodest just in case you expect your own belief 
state to be more accurate than any specific alternative belief state. And let Immodesty be the 
thesis that you should be immodest. So stated, Immodesty is a fairly generic thesis which may 
be precisified in different ways, depending on how we represent an agent’s belief state. On 
the most common such precisification, an agent’s belief state is represented by a (sharp) 
credence function, which is said to be immodest just in case it expects itself to be more 
accurate than any specific alternative credence function.16 Readers who are familiar with this 
way of defining Immodesty are welcome to apply it below, but the finer details of how to 
define Immodesty won’t matter for present purposes. 
Why think that Immodesty is true? Perhaps the most frequently cited reason is that there 
seems to be something “unstable” or “self-undermining” about having a belief state that one 
takes to be less accurate than some specific alternative belief state. After all, if you really did 
think that some other belief state was more accurate than your own, why not adopt it instead? 
Here is Lewis (1971) making essentially this point: 
[W]ould non-immodesty give you any good reason not to trust an inductive method? Indeed 
it would. Suppose you did trust some non-immodest method. By definition, it estimates 
some competing method to be more accurate than itself. So if you really did trust your 
original method, you should take its advice and transfer your trust to one of the competing 
methods it recommends. (Lewis 1971, p. 56) 
Let’s not worry about what, exactly, Lewis meant by “inductive method” here.17 The 
important point for present purposes is that the same can be said about belief states: if your 
belief state estimates some competing belief state to be more accurate than itself, then, if you 
really did trust your own belief state, it seems that you should take its advice and transfer to 
the competing belief state instead. 
This may seem plausible enough. But it doesn’t quite get us all the way to Immodesty. 
It only gets us something weaker: that you should expect your own belief state to be no less 
accurate than any other belief state. For as long as you take your own belief state to be among 
 
16 The expected accuracy of a credence function, Cr1, calculated with respect to a (possibly identical) credence 
function, Cr2, is the average of the accuracy of Cr1 at different possible worlds, weighted by the probability 
assigned by Cr2 to those worlds obtaining. 
17 Formally, Lewis defines inductive methods in the same way that (conditional) credence functions are usually 
defined: as mappings from pairs of propositions to real numbers between 0 and 1 (Lewis 1971, p. 54). 
 
the most accurate ones, there isn’t obviously anything unstable or self-undermining about 
your belief state.18 
However, a recent result by Campbell-Moore & Levinstein (2021) shows that the weak 
version of Immodesty in fact entails the strong version, given some fairly minimal 
background assumptions, which many proponents of Immodesty are willing to accept.19 It 
would take us too far afield to review the formal details of this result (an informal sketch of 
the argument is included in a footnote).20 Suffice it to say that, insofar as Lewis’s stability 
considerations are taken to motivate the weak version of Immodesty, they should arguably 
be taken to motivate the strong version of Immodesty as well. 
A second line of motivation for Immodesty worth mentioning comes from the 
“accuracy-first” program in epistemology, instigated by Joyce (1998) and fruitfully developed 
by Pettigrew (2016) and others. It is well-known that many of the central results in this area—
including those employed by Joyce (1998) and Greaves & Wallace (2006) to defend 
Probabilism and Conditionalization, respectively—rely crucially on Immodesty.21 Whether, 
or to what extent, this should be taken to lend support to Immodesty obviously depends on 
how promising one finds the accuracy-based approach to epistemology in the first place. But 
those who are moved by accuracy-based arguments may reasonably take themselves to have 
broadly abductive reasons to accept Immodesty. 
4.2 Self-Ascriptions of Epistemic Luck 
The final ingredient needed for our inconsistent triad is the view that rationality forbids 
certain kinds of self-ascriptions of epistemic luck. To illustrate the phenomenon I have in 
mind, consider an example due to Roger White (2005, pp. 447-48): 
 
18 This point has been appreciated by a number of authors, including Pettigrew (2011, §4.1), Mayo-Wilson and 
Wheeler (2016, p. 65), and Campbell-Moore & Levinstein (2021, p. 10). 
19 The first assumption is known as “Truth-directedness” and says, roughly, that the closer your credences are 
to the truth, the more accurate they are. The second assumption is known as “Additivity” and says, roughly, 
that the overall accuracy of your credence function at a given world is just the sum of the accuracy of each of 
your credences in different propositions at that world. Both assumptions are usually taken for granted within 
accuracy-first epistemology, though see Pettigrew (forthcoming) for a recent criticism of Additivity. 
20 For simplicity, consider just a single proposition, p, and consider two distinct credence functions, Cr1 and 
Cr2, such that Cr1 expects itself to be at least as accurate as Cr2 with respect to p. Since Cr1 and Cr2 are distinct, 
Cr1(p) ≠ Cr2(p). Suppose, without loss of generality, that Cr1(p) < Cr2(p). We can then find a number x: Cr1(p) 
< x < Cr2(p). Now consider a third credence function Cr3: Cr3(p) = x. By Truth-directedness, Cr1 must expect 
Cr3 to be strictly more accurate than Cr2 with respect to p. And, by weak Immodesty, Cr1 must expect itself to 
be at least as accurate as Cr3 with respect to p. So, Cr1 must expect itself to be strictly more accurate than Cr2 
with respect to p. As Campbell-Moore and Levinstein show, by adding Additivity, this line of argument can be 
generalized to credence functions which are defined over a full algebra. 
21 More precisely, they rely on the assumption that the accuracy of credence functions is to be measured using 
a strictly proper scoring rule, that is, a scoring rule that has the property that every probabilistic credence function 
is immodest. 
 
Belief-Inducing Pills: You have no idea whether p. But you have a couple of magical 
belief-inducing pills. One, when swallowed, will give you a true belief about p, the other 
a false belief. You have no idea which one is the Truth pill. Yet, you go ahead and 
swallow one of the pills at random. Next thing you know, you find yourself believing 
that p. On reflection, you think to yourself: “My belief that p was induced by the pill I 
swallowed. And p is true. So, I must have swallowed the Truth pill. What luck!” 
As White points out, there seems to be something utterly irrational about someone who 
reasons this way. If this isn’t immediately clear, just imagine repeating the process many times 
over (we may suppose that you’ve been given a jar full of magical pills, half of which are 
Truth pills, and half of which are Falsity pills). Each time, you swallow a pill at random, find 
yourself with a newly minted belief, and conclude that, since your belief is true, you must 
have swallowed one of the Truth pills. If you do this ten times in a row, you’ll end up thinking 
to yourself: “All ten of my beliefs were induced by a randomly chosen pill. And all ten beliefs 
are true. So, I must have chosen a Truth pill ten times in a row. But the chance of that 
happening is a mere (1/2)10 ≈ 0.1%. What an incredible stroke of luck!” That’s absurd. 
Increase the number of repetitions even further, and we can make the absurdity as vivid as 
we like. 
Let No Luck be the thesis that the kind of self-ascribed epistemic luck exemplified by 
Belief-Inducing Pills can never be rational. Needless to say, this doesn’t amount to a precise 
definition. But a precise definition won’t be needed. Later, I’ll provide some further examples 
of self-ascriptions of epistemic luck, which will be recognizably similar to Belief-Inducing 
Pills. This will suffice to bring out the inconsistency. 
Before we proceed, however, let me clarify two points about what No Luck doesn’t say. 
First, No Luck doesn’t say that it’s irrational to be epistemically lucky; it just says that it’s 
irrational to self-ascribe the relevant kind of epistemic luck. To illustrate the difference, 
consider the following modification of Belief-Inducing Pills: 
Modified Belief-Inducing Pills: You believe that p. For all you can tell, your belief has 
been formed in an entirely ordinary way (say, on the basis of perception). However, 
unbeknownst to you, your belief has in fact been induced by a magical pill, which was 
slipped into your drink last night by an unscrupulous drug scientist. The pill was 
randomly selected from a jar that contains equal proportions of Truth and Falsity pills. 
Luckily, you were slipped one of the Truth pills. 
Here it may be less clear whether your belief is irrational, as witnessed by the long-standing 
debate between internalists and externalists about epistemic justification.22 Fortunately, we 
don’t have to take a stance on this issue here—No Luck is silent in cases like Modified Belief-
Inducing Pills. 
 
22 Classic references in this debate include Goldman (1979), BonJour (1980), and Cohen (1984). 
 
Second, it’s worth distinguishing No Luck from a different kind of anti-luck thesis, 
which has played a central role in the post-Gettier literature on the nature of knowledge: the 
thesis that you can’t know that p if your belief that p is true merely by luck.23 This thesis 
differs from No Luck in at least two respects: first, it concerns knowledge rather than rational 
belief; and, second, it says that knowledge is incompatible with being epistemically lucky, not 
that knowledge is incompatible with self-ascribing the relevant kind of epistemic luck. 
4.3 Why Rational Arbitrariness, Immodesty, and No Luck Are Jointly 
Inconsistent 
We’ve now been introduced to three claims—Rational Arbitrariness, Immodesty, and No 
Luck—and we’ve seen what makes them attractive. Why are they jointly inconsistent? The 
answer may already be obvious from what has been said, but here is a fairly general way of 
bringing out the inconsistency: Consider an agent whose belief state has been, in the relevant 
sense, arbitrarily formed. If Rational Arbitrariness is true, we can assume that the agent’s 
belief state is rational. And if Immodesty is true, the agent should expect her own belief state 
to be more accurate than any specific alternative belief state. So, the agent is in a position to 
reason as follows: “My belief state has been influenced, in part, by factors that don’t bear on 
the truth. Yet, I’ve ended up with a belief state that is expectedly more accurate than any 
other belief state I might have ended up with. What luck!” But that’s precisely the kind of 
self-ascribed epistemic luck that No Luck is supposed to deem irrational. So, Rational 
Arbitrariness, Immodesty, and No Luck can’t all be true. 
It’s worth pausing to consider how this inconsistency can manifest itself in a more 
concrete case. Take again the Subjective Bayesian who thinks that there is more than one 
permissible prior, and consider an agent whose credence function is based on one such 
permissible prior. As explained in §3.1, the agent’s credence function has then been, in the 
relevant sense, arbitrarily formed: it has been influenced by the agent’s prior, which the agent 
doesn’t take herself to have any independent reason to think is more likely to have resulted 
in accurate credences than any other permissible prior.24 And if Immodesty is true, the agent 
should expect her own credence function to be more accurate than any alternative credence 
function. So, the agent is in a position to reason as follows: “My credence function has been 
influenced, in part, by my choice of prior. And I have no independent reason to think that 
my prior would result in more accurate credences than any other permissible prior. Yet, I’ve 
ended up with a credence function that is expectedly more accurate than any other credence 
function I might have ended up with. What luck!” That’s a violation of No Luck. 
 
23 Discussions of this sort of anti-luck thesis can be found in Unger (1968), Zagzebski (1994), Pritchard (2005), 
among others. 
24 Assuming, for the purposes of illustration, that the permissivist under consideration (here: the Subjective 
Bayesian) accepts Acknowledged Permissivism and Permissive Parity.  
 
For another example, consider the view that there are different permissible trade-offs 
between the “Jamesian goals” of believing what is true and not believing what is false, and consider 
an agent whose belief state is based on one such permissible trade-off. Then again, the agent’s 
belief state has been, in the relevant sense, arbitrarily formed: it has been influenced by the 
agent’s Jamesian trade-off, which the agent doesn’t take herself to have any independent 
reason to think is more likely to result in accurate beliefs than any other permissible trade-
off. By Immodesty, the agent should expect her own belief state to be more accurate than 
any alternative belief state. So, the agent is in a position to reason as follows: “My belief state 
has been influenced, in part, by my preferred Jamesian trade-off between the goals of believing 
what is true and not believing what is false. And I have no independent reason to think that my 
own trade-off would result in more accurate beliefs than any other permissible trade-off. Yet, 
I’ve ended up with a belief state that is expectedly more accurate than any other belief state 
I might have ended up with. What luck!” Again, that’s a violation of No Luck. 
The more general pattern should now be clear: any epistemological view which is 
committed to Rational Arbitrariness will, when combined with Immodesty, inevitably lead 
to self-ascriptions of epistemic luck. In other words: Rational Arbitrariness, Immodesty, and 
No Luck are jointly inconsistent. That’s the first major upshot of the paper. 
5. Responses to the Inconsistent Triad 
We have an inconsistent triad on our hands. What to do about it? At the highest level of 
generality, we have three options: we can either deny Immodesty, No Luck, or Rational 
Arbitrariness. Below, I’ll examine each of these options in turn. As mentioned in the 
introduction, I won’t defend any particular response over the others. But I hope to be able 
to say enough about the costs and benefits of the different responses to allow us to move 
forward with a better understanding of the tension at hand. 
5.1 Rejecting Immodesty 
One reaction to the inconsistent triad is to give up on the idea that you should always expect 
your own belief state to be more accurate than any alternative belief state. How might such 
a response be motivated? The most principled reason to doubt Immodesty, to my 
knowledge, comes from recent work on imprecise credences. Many epistemologists have 
claimed that, in response to certain kinds of vague or ambiguous evidence, it can be rational 
to adopt an imprecise (or “mushy”) credence rather than a precise (or “sharp”) one.25 
Imprecise credal states are usually represented by sets of precise credence functions, which 
together make up what is known as the agent’s representor.26 So, for example, if you have an 
imprecise credence in p that spans the interval from 20% to 30%, your representor will 
 
25 Influential examples include Levi (1985) and Joyce (2005). 
26 This term was, I believe, coined by van Fraassen (1990). 
 
include, for each real number x between 20% and 30%, a precise credence function that 
assigns a probability of exactly x to p (and no credence function in your representor will 
assign a probability below 20% or above 30% to p). 
Now it remains controversial whether imprecise credences can indeed be rational.27 But 
if they can, there’s arguably good reason to think that we should reject Immodesty, at least 
in its most general form. A result by Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler (2016) shows that, given certain 
background assumptions about how to measure accuracy, the following two claims are true: 
(i) for every imprecise credence function, there is a precise credence function that is exactly 
as accurate at every world; and (ii) for every precise credence function, there is an imprecise 
credence function that is exactly as accurate at every world.28 In other words, neither precise 
nor imprecise credence functions are immodest: they don’t expect themselves to be more 
accurate than every other precise or imprecise credence function. 
To interpret this result, it will be helpful to adopt a bit of terminology from Builes et al. 
(2020): let’s say that you contract when you move from an imprecise credence function to a 
precise credence function, and let’s say that you dilate when you move from a precise credence 
function to an imprecise one. What Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler’s result shows, then, is that it’s 
possible for an agent to contract and dilate arbitrarily—that is, without receiving any new 
evidence—without incurring any loss of expected accuracy, that is, without at any point 
moving to a new credal state that, by the agent’s current lights, has a lower expected accuracy 
than the agent’s current credal state. 
How might this result help us resolve the inconsistent triad? The beginnings of an 
answer can be found in a paper by Miriam Schoenfield (forthcoming), who entertains the 
idea that there might be a close relationship between arbitrary belief formation and imprecise 
credences. More specifically, Schoenfield suggests that when we pause to reflect on the fact 
that a given belief of ours has been influenced by truth-irrelevant factors, we tend not to 
adopt a very precise credence on the matter. Rather, we tend to adopt an imprecise credence. 
And as we’ve just seen, imprecise credences aren’t immodest: they allow us to contract to a 
precise credence at no loss of expected accuracy. So, even if you realize that your credence 
on a given matter has been influenced by truth-irrelevant factors, it might still be rational for 
you to adopt a precise credence on the matter. Indeed, the credence may be opinionated: if 
you start out being more than 50% confident of p, you may end up being more than 50% 
confident of p upon learning that your opinionated credal state was influenced by factors that 
do not bear on the truth. That’s the gist of Schoenfield’s proposal, as I understand it. 
 
27 For example, Elga (2010) argues that imprecise credences leave agents “Dutch Bookable.” 
28 The result builds on a similar result by Seidenfeld, Schervish & Kadane (2012). A closely related result has 
also been established by Schoenfield (2017). The background assumptions needed for Mayo-Wilson & 
Wheeler’s result are: “Admissibility” (roughly, the claim that permissible credence functions aren’t accuracy-
dominated), “Extensionality” (roughly, the claim that the accuracy of a credence relative to a proposition and 
a world is a function only of the credence and the truth-value of the proposition at that world), and “Continuity” 
(roughly, the claim that the accuracy of a credence relative to a proposition and a world is a continuous function 
of the credence).  
 
It’s natural to wonder what reason there is to think that people tend to adopt an 
imprecise credal state when reflecting on the fact that their beliefs have been influenced by 
truth-irrelevant factors. Schoenfield herself doesn’t purport to defend this claim by 
argument, and I won’t here try to guess what such an argument might look like. But if 
Schoenfield’s proposal is on the right track, it promises to go at least some way towards 
resolving the inconsistent triad at hand. 
Unfortunately, I don’t think it goes far enough. The trouble is that Schoenfield’s 
proposal is still meant to satisfy a restricted version of Immodesty, which applies only at the 
level of precise credences: 
Precise Immodesty: A precise credence function is rational only if it expects itself to 
be more accurate than any other precise credence function. 
This restricted Immodesty principle is enough to generate self-ascriptions of epistemic luck 
in cases where an agent contracts arbitrarily from an imprecise to a precise credence function. 
Consider an agent who currently has an imprecise credence function, and let Cr1 and Cr2 be 
any two precise credence functions in the agent’s representor. Now suppose that the agent 
contracts arbitrarily to Cr1. By Precise Immodesty, the agent should now—after having 
contracted—expect Cr1 to be more accurate than Cr2. But since the agent contracted 
arbitrarily, she didn’t take herself to have any accuracy-based reasons for contracting to Cr1 
rather than Cr2. So, the agent must consider herself lucky to have contracted to Cr1 rather 
than Cr2. Thus, even if we deny Immodesty in its most general form, we still run into 
violations of No Luck if we combine Precise Immodesty with the view that it can be rational 
to contract arbitrarily from imprecise to precise credences. Schoenfield’s proposal ultimately 
leaves the inconsistent triad intact.29 
5.2 Rejecting No Luck 
A different reaction to our inconsistent triad is to concede that self-ascriptions of epistemic 
luck, odd as they may seem, can nonetheless be rational. This response has been perhaps 
most explicitly endorsed by Adam Elga (ms.) in an unpublished paper entitled “Lucky to Be 
Rational.”30 In brief outline, Elga’s argument goes as follows: Consider a rational agent who 
learns that their most fundamental epistemic standards were determined by arbitrary factors. 
If it isn’t clear that a rational agent could undergo such a learning experience, put yourself in 
the following scenario (with homage to a certain famous physicist):31 
 
29 Thanks to an anonymous referee for help with the framing of this section. 
30 See also White (2010, §4.3) and Schoenfield (2014, fn. 20). 
31 Readers who prefer a less divine example may replace “God” by “Mother Nature” and replace “throw of a 
die” by any naturalistically kosher chance process. 
 
God Plays Dice: God created you with an epistemic standard, which was chosen on 
the basis of a throw of a fair die. If the die came up even, God gave you a reliable 
epistemic standard; if not, not. God tells you that this is how your epistemic standard 
was determined, but you have no clue about whether the die came up even or odd. In 
fact, it came up even. 
How should you react upon learning how your epistemic standard was determined? It’s 
natural to think that you should lose confidence in the reliability of your own epistemic 
standard—after all, you have no idea of whether the die came up even or odd. But as Elga 
points out, if you did lose confidence in the reliability of your own epistemic standard, it 
would have to be your epistemic standard itself that recommended this response—after all, 
an agent’s epistemic standard is supposed to govern the agent’s response to any new evidence, 
including evidence about how the agent came to possess that standard. In other words, your 
epistemic standard would have to be modest: it would have to recommend doubting its own 
reliability. So, on pain of violating Immodesty, you shouldn’t lose confidence in your own 
epistemic standard after all. Rather, you should stand behind your own epistemic standard, 
and consider yourself lucky to have ended up with that standard. That’s the gist of Elga’s 
argument. 
There are different ways one might try to push back against this argument. For example, 
Schechter (ms., pp. 7-8) points out that if it’s never rational to doubt one’s most fundamental 
epistemic standards, those standards would seem to be immune to criticism, which might 
seem counterintuitive.32 I don’t want to pursue this line of criticism. The more important 
point here is that Elga’s motivation for rejecting No Luck ultimately derives from his 
motivation for accepting Rational Arbitrariness and Immodesty. In other words, the reason 
why Elga thinks that we have good reason to accept that self-ascriptions of epistemic luck 
can be rational is that he thinks that we have good reason to accept Rational Arbitrariness 
and Immodesty. This isn’t a problem in and of itself. But it means that Elga’s argument won’t 
be dialectically effective against someone who hasn’t yet made up their mind about how to 
resolve the inconsistent triad at hand. Those of us who are in this situation are looking for 
ways to resolve the inconsistent triad, which don’t depend on whatever reason we had for 
accepting each of the three inconsistent theses in the first place. 
Admittedly, it’s not clear what a suitably independent argument against No Luck might 
look like. The claim that self-ascriptions of epistemic luck are irrational seems to capture a 
pretty basic intuition. But even if we can’t argue against No Luck from more basic principles, 
it might still be possible to offer some sort of explanation (or “error theory”) of why we’d 
be inclined to think that self-ascriptions of epistemic luck are irrational, when in fact they are 
not. To my knowledge, no such explanation has been offered in the literature, and I have no 
 
32 See also Schechter (2013, §4.2) for a discussion of this point. 
 
proposal here for how to provide it.33 But without such an explanation, it seems to me that 
denying No Luck involves an egregious amount of bullet-biting. 
5.3 Rejecting Rational Arbitrariness 
Perhaps, then, we should deny that arbitrary beliefs can be rational in the first place. In light  
of what has been said, this might seem like the least radical solution to the problem at hand. 
After all, the central motivations for Rational Arbitrariness reviewed in §3 all rely on broadly 
theoretical considerations, which may be denied without flying in the face of normative 
common sense.  
But even if denying Rational Arbitrariness doesn’t do any immediate violence on our 
intuitions, we’re still left with a major task of explaining where the different arguments for 
Rational Arbitrariness go wrong. This isn’t a task I can possibly hope to do justice to here. 
As we’ve seen, the considerations that have persuaded epistemologists that arbitrary beliefs 
can be rational are bound up with some notoriously difficult questions that are best dealt 
with in a piecemeal fashion (questions about whether epistemic rationality is permissive, and 
questions about the extent to which we can provide independent justification for our most 
fundamental epistemic standards). Nonetheless, it seems to me that those who are inclined 
to respond to the inconsistent triad by denying Rational Arbitrariness eventually owe a story 
about where the different arguments for Rational Arbitrariness go wrong. Simply insisting 
on our intuitions in support of Immodesty and No Luck isn’t going to cut it. 
6. Conclusion 
I had two main goals in this paper. The first goal was to bring out a joint inconsistency 
between three individually attractive claims: Rational Arbitrariness, Immodesty, and No 
Luck. The second goal was to evaluate different possible responses to this inconsistent triad. 
As we’ve seen, each response comes with its own distinctive challenges, which call out for 
further investigation. As things stand, my own sympathies tend towards denying Rational 
Arbitrariness, though I haven’t tried to argue that this response is more attractive than the 
alternatives. My more limited hope is that the reader will at least come away with an 
appreciation of the tension at hand, and perhaps with a sense of how to make further inroads 
into the question of how to resolve it. 
 
33 Somewhat relatedly, Elga (ms., pp. 6-8) offers a diagnosis of the “unsettling feeling” we get when we discover 
that our epistemic standards have been influenced by arbitrary factors. Very roughly, Elga suggests that such a 
discovery merely makes salient a general skeptical worry, which was present all along. Schechter (ms., §4) raises 
some potential worries about this diagnosis. But in any case, what we’re looking for here is not an explanation 
of why we’d be inclined to think (mistakenly) that arbitrary influences on our epistemic standards are a cause 
for concern. Rather, we’re looking for an explanation of why we’d be inclined to think that self-ascriptions of 
epistemic luck are irrational, when in fact they needn’t be. 
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